基于控制权私有收益视角的可转债融资的治理效应研究  

Governance Effect of Convertible Debt:A Study Based on Private Benefits of Control

作　　者：徐细雄[1] 刘星[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2012年第3期459-465,共7页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71102063);教育部博士点基金资助项目(20100191120041);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(09YJC630243);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(CDJSK11009;CDJSK100056)

摘　　要：通过在职消费、过度投资、自由现金流和现金股利支付4个变量间接测度管理者攫取的控制权私有收益,并运用中国A股市场数据实证检验权益、债务和可转债3种不同融资方式下(横向比较)以及可转债发行前后(纵向比较)企业控制权私有收益的差异。研究结果表明,可转债发行将导致在职消费和自由现金流的降低以及现金股利支付的增加;但在抑制管理者过度投资中可转债并未发挥积极作用。研究结果为优化我国企业融资结构,完善内部公司治理提供了理论支持;同时,也将为促进我国资本市场金融创新提供新的证据。Combining external financing and internal corporate governance, this paper discusses the corporate governance effect of convertible debt based on private benefits of control. This paper measures private benefits of control indirectly through managerial perks, overinvestment, free cash flow and dividends by cash, and then examines the difference of private benefits of control under different financial styles. The empirical results show that, managerial perks and firm＇s free cash flow will decrease, and the dividends by cash will increase with the issuing of convertible debt but we can not find the relationship between overinvestment and issuing of convertible debt. This research will be of some help to improve corporate governance and financial construct of Chinese enterprise, and will also bring some advice to advancement of Chinese financial innovation.

关 键 词：控制权私有收益 可转债 治理效应 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]