信息不对称、异质性交易与企业资本结构的决定  

Information Asymmetry,Heterogeneous Trading and the Determinants of Capital Structure

作　　者：陈辉[1] 顾乃康[2] 朱雪嫣[2] 

机构地区：[1]广东金融学院中国金融转型与发展研究中心,广东广州510521 [2]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2012年第2期95-105,共11页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70772079);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(07JA630023);广东高校优秀青年创新人才培养计划项目(wym11092)

摘　　要：在将信息不对称划分为内部人和外部人之间以及知情交易者和非知情交易者之间的基础上,借鉴金融市场微观结构和财务学的相关理论成果测度这两类信息不对称,使用中国上市公司的数据,考察了这两类信息不对称与企业资本结构的关系。结果表明,两类信息不对称程度越高,杠杆水平越低;前者对杠杆的影响程度在小公司中更强,而后者对杠杆的作用效果在大公司中更强。此外,股权分置改革在某种程度上降低了前者的影响程度,而提升了后者的作用效果。这表明,我国资本市场的主要问题可能已由原先的内部人和外部人之间的利益冲突,转变为知情投资者和非知情投资者之间的利益冲突。The paper divides the information asymmetry into two categories,i.e.the information asymmetry between insider and outsider and the information asymmetry between informed investor and uninformed investor.On the basis of China＇s listed companies,the paper explores the relationship between these two kinds of information asymmetry and capital structure by employing the research results of market microstructure theories and corporate finance theories.The results show that,the higher these two kinds of information asymmetry,the higher the financial leverage.The effect of the former is stronger in small companies and the effect of the latter is stronger in large companies.Furthermore,the non-tradable shares reform lower the effect of the former and enhance the effect of the latter.This means the main problem of Chinese capital market has transferred from the conflict between insider and outsider to the conflict between informed investor and uninformed investor.

关 键 词：信息不对称 资本结构 累积超额收益率 PIN 股权分置改革 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]