不完全信息的装备采购博弈  

Research on Incomplete Information Game Strategies of Equipment Purchases

作　　者：周华任[1,2] 岳磊[2] 马元正[2] 马亚平[2] 

机构地区：[1]解放军理工大学理学院,南京211101 [2]解放军国防大学信息作战与指挥训练教研部,北京100091

出　　处：《火力与指挥控制》2012年第1期144-147,共4页Fire Control & Command Control

摘　　要：目前,我国的军品市场正由封闭市场向一个相对开放竞争的环境转变。基于不完全信息的装备采购的博弈模型,探讨了在不完全信息的相对开放的竞争环境下,军企双方对对方的策略、偏好、所处的地位或者状态的信息等策略问题进行了解,并给出了求解方法,通过实例进行了说明,对装备采购实践具有一定的指导意义。Our military market is changing from the closed market to a opened competitive entironment now.At this opened competitive entironment of the incomplete information,the game model of equipment purchases discusses the strategies, which describe the status that army and the corporation only partly know the type and the effect of each other and gives the solution.Its validity is indicated by an example.The model can be used to instruct equipment acquisition.

关 键 词：装备采购 模型 博弈论 不完全信息静态博弈 

分 类 号：E257[军事—军事理论]