生产能力限制下价格Stackelberg博弈模型  

Price Stackelberg Competition and Capacity Constraints

作　　者：孟令鹏[1] 韩传峰[1] 王剑敏[2] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092 [2]山东大学数学学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2012年第1期139-144,共6页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(70871093);国家自然科学基金重大研究计划重点项目(91024023);上海市重点学科建设项目(B310)

摘　　要：生产能力限制条件下,同质产品市场中两企业以价格为决策变量进行Stackelberg竞争,采取有效配给规则。两企业对称情况下,生产能力较小时模型存在唯一的子博弈精炼纳什均衡,两企业销量达到自身生产能力,得到相同收益;生产能力较大时,追随企业匹配领头企业的价格,博弈存在后动优势。分析了领头企业生产能力大于追随企业的不对称情形,并给出相应均衡。算例分析表明,企业价格竞争的前提是充分大的供给能力,追随企业应在领头企业生产能力较大时进入市场。Two identical firms compete with price as the strategic variable in a homogeneous product duopo ly game. The firms are limited by capacity constraints, and an efficient rationing rule is adopted. We show that when the firms are symmetric and have a small capacity, there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equi- librium, in which they both sell up to their capacity and get the same payoff. In another certain capacity range, the follower will adopt the same price with the leader, and there is a second mover advantage. We analyze an asymmetric case and attain the equilibrium. The example analysis indicates that price competition is based on the large enough capacity, and the follower should enter the market when the leader has a relatively larger capacity

关 键 词：STACKELBERG均衡 价格 生产能力限制 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论] F224.32[理学—数学]