C2C网上交易中信号机制的有效性分析  

The Effect of Signal Strategies in C2C E-marketplaces

作　　者：肖俊极[1] 刘玲[2] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433 [2]上海电力学院经济与管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2012年第1期161-170,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：自然科学基金青年科学基金项目(71002030)

摘　　要：本文应用Berry等(1995)[2]提出的离散选择需求模型和差异产品的伯川德竞争模型,并利用淘宝网上的交易数据,对声誉、消费者保障计划、保修服务及信息披露四种信号策略在网上交易中的作用进行了实证研究。需求估计结果表明消费者保障计划中的"7天无理由退换货"计划以及保修服务可以作为产品质量的信号;而在其他有效信号策略存在的情况下,消费者保障计划中的"先行赔付"计划以及卖家声誉作为质量信号的作用则被削弱。成本分析表明,信息披露虽然可以提高消费者购买的可能性,但是由于发出信号的成本太低,容易被低质量卖家所模仿,因此并不能作为有效的质量信号。本文首次从供给和需求两个方面分析了信号机制在信息不对称情况下的效应及其作用机制。Using the discrete choice model and the differentiated Bertrand- equilibrium model proposed by Berry et al. （1995）and data from Taobao. com, this paper examines the effectiveness of four signaling strategies： reputation, Buyer Protection Program, warranty services and information disclosure, by studying both the demand and the supply sides of the market. The results of demand side indicate that for the present trust mechanism in Taobao. com, the ＂7-Day＂ program in BPPs and warranty services can signal product quality. However, the ＂indemnity in advance＂ program in BPPs and reputation cannot lead to a partial separating equilibrium in the present of more effective signaling strategies. The results of supply side suggest that information disclosure can increase the probability of buyers purchase, but it cannot signal quality since it is easy for low-quality sellers to mimic the strategy of the high-quality sellers. This is the first study to analyze the mechanism and effect of signal strategies from both demand side and supply side.

关 键 词：信任 信号机制 网上交易 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]