IPO市场中风险投资家策略的演化博弈分析  

Analysis on venture capitalists' strategies in IPO market based on evolutionary game

作　　者：郑君君[1] 韩笑[1] 邹祖绪[1] 范文涛[2] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,武汉430072 [2]中国科学院武汉物理与数学所,武汉430071

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2012年第2期72-82,共11页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071120)

摘　　要：在IPO市场中,由于风险投资家和外部投资者之间存在事前信息不对称,导致风险资本退出过程中普遍存在逆向选择问题,而声誉的激励效应和监督机制的惩罚效应可以减轻和规避此类问题.运用演化博弈理论与方法,研究了具有有限理性的不同类型风险投资家与外部投资者之间策略选择的互动机制,探讨了声誉的激励效应和监督机制的惩罚效应对不同风险投资家的有效性,及其如何引导和制约风险投资家的策略选择,并给出了相关建议,为解决风险投资中的逆向选择问题提供了理论依据.In the IPO market, the asymmetry information between venture capitalists（VCs） and outside investors can easily lead to adverse selection problem during the process of venture capital exit. However, the incentive effects of reputation and the punishment effects of supervision can reduce, even avoid such problem effectively. Considering the bounded rationality of players, we analyze the interaction mechanism between the VCs＇ policy and the outside investors＇ policy by using evolutionary game theory and method. We demonstrated the incentive effect of reputation and the constraint effect of supervision on different VCs, and discussed how the reputation and supervision guide VCs＇ strategy selection. At last, some suggestions are offered for both VCs and outside investors, which can provide a theoretical basis for solving adverse selection problem in venture capital.

关 键 词：逆向选择 演化博弈 复制动态方程 

分 类 号：F224.9[经济管理—国民经济]