农村信用社、国家与农贷悖论  

Rural Credit Cooperatives,State and the Agricultural Credit Paradox

作　　者：易棉阳[1] 曾鹃[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南工业大学商学院,湖南株洲412008

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第1期12-16,共5页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(08CJL028);湖南省社会科学联合会项目(0803028B)

摘　　要：在中国农村信用社的演变史迹中,存在一个迄今尚未破解的农贷悖论命题:本该服务于"弱势群体"的农信社,却没有为弱势者服好务。农信社始终被国家所控制,其经营目标主要是满足国家效用而非社员效用,这是农贷悖论产生的主要原因。破解农贷悖论的关键在于正确界定国家在农村信用社的行为边界:国家要么退出农信社,要么控制农信社。There is an unsolved agricultural credit paradox proposition in the historical evolution of China＇s rural credit cooperatives until now, that is, the rural credit cooperatives belonging to the vulnerable groups didn＇t serve them well enough. The main reasons for the agricultural credit paradox are the rural credit cooperatives are always controlled by the state,thus, their operation objectives are mainly to meet the national utility rather than the effectiveness of the members. The key to crack the agricultural credit paradox lies in the correct definition of the national behavior boundaries in the rural credit cooperatives：Either the state withdraws from the rural credit cooperatives, or controls them.

关 键 词：农村信用社 合作金融 信贷 农贷悖论 

分 类 号：F830.58[经济管理—金融学]