抽检制度与企业劣质产品生产行为的关系研究  

Relationship of the Random Inspection System and Manufacturing of Inferior Quality Products

作　　者：陶新[1] 孙绍荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海杨浦200093

出　　处：《技术与创新管理》2012年第1期61-64,76,共5页Technology and Innovation Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70871080);上海市重点学科(S30504);上海市教委科研创新重点项目(11ZS138)

摘　　要：文章针对我国抽检制度在实施的过程中仍然存在很多生产劣质产品的企业,这种现状严重损害了消费者的合法权益、破坏了国家的安定、在国际方面损害了国家形象。从博弈论的研究视角出发,对企业的行为选择进行分析并提出治理和引导对策,即政府部门不仅要从法律的角度加大企业生产劣质品的惩罚力度,还要从经济的角度对企业进行引导以及从降低质检工作的成本出发,制定合理的奖惩制度来激励质检部门的工作等对企业进行治理和引导。Nowadays random inspection system has been put into effect, but there are still a lot of companies producing in- ferior quality products. Those products seriously harm the consumers＇ legal fights and benefits, harm their physical and mental health, and even break our social stability. Internationally, China＇ s reputation and benefits are both impaired. Chi- nese government should not only increase the level of legal sanction of those companies that produce inferior quality prod- ucts, but also provide proper guide for enterprises. Besides, reasonable system for reward and punishment should be estab- lished to encourage the quality contrel department. This can start with decreasing the cost of quality control.

关 键 词：抽检制度 混合博弈 纳什均衡 治理对策 

分 类 号：F203[经济管理—国民经济]