审计师变更、时机选择与投资者评价  

Auditor Switches,Timing and Investor Evaluation

作　　者：张鸣[1] 田野[2] 陈全 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学会计与财务研究院,上海200233 [2]中国人民大学博士后流动站,北京100872 [3]兴业证券投资银行部,上海200135

出　　处：《财经研究》2012年第3期59-69,共11页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大研究项目(2009JJD790031);中国博士后科学基金第五十批面上项目(2011M500465)的资助

摘　　要：文章从投资者评价的角度对我国证券市场中审计师变更事件的经济后果进行考察。研究发现,在我国证券审计市场中,审计师变更事件具有显著为正的市场反应;市场总体正的累计超额回报主要是由晚变更样本的公告信息引起,晚变更公司在变更公告日附近的累计超额回报为正,并且显著大于早变更的公司;总体来看,审计师变更会显著降低公司的财务盈利可信度,并且在审计师变更以后,晚变更公司盈利可信度的下降程度显著大于早变更的公司。This paper studies the economic consequences ot auditor switches from the angle of investor evaluation in China＇s securities market. It arrives at the conclusions as follows- firstly, auditor switches have a posi- tive effect on the securities market and the overall positive cumulative excess returns are mainly caused by the announcements of later auditor switches, namely the cumulative excess returns of firms with later auditor switches are positive and are significantly greater than the ones with earlier auditor swit- ches; secondly, auditor switches reduce obviously the earnings credibility, and the reduction in earnings credibility of firms with later auditor switches is significantly greater than the reduction in earnings credibility of firms with earlier auditor switches.

关 键 词：审计师变更 时机选择 市场反应 盈利可信度 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]