绩效考核中的推定效应  

Presumption Effect in the Performance Appraisal

作　　者：郑勇强[1] 李一智[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院

出　　处：《财务与金融》2012年第1期50-53,共4页Accounting and Finance

摘　　要：在考评对象的工作绩效不能完全观察的中,人们不得不在绩效考评中引入推定原则。推定原则所带来的基本效应是逆向选择。按照完全理性假定,考评对象按后悔值最小原则确定行为策略。当采用偷懒策略的后悔值小于采用努力策略的后悔值时,绩效工资可能会激励考评对象偷懒和屏蔽工作绩效信息的行为。走出绩效推定情境中的逆向选择的困境的基本思路是提高考评对象采用偷懒策略的后悔值。为此,一方面要提高考评主体认知考评对象实施偷懒策略的概率;另一方面要增大考评对象实施偷懒策略的或有损失。In the process of performance appraisal,when the performance of appraisal object would not be fully observed,people have to introduce the presumption principle.And the basic effect of presumption principle is adverse selection.According to the entirely rational assumption,the object of performance appraisal will confirm their options in accordance with least regret value.When the regret value of taking lazy strategy is smaller than the regret value of taking hard-working strategy,performance payment will encourage the appraisal object to take lazy and shielding performance information strategy.To walk out the dilemma of adverse selection in the simulation of presumption,the basic thinking is to increase the regret value for appraisal object to take lazy strategy.Therefore,on the one hand we need increase the probability of knowing the appraisal object＇s lazy strategy,and on the other hand we need to increase the probable loss of appraisal object to take lazy strategy.

关 键 词：绩效考评 推定原则 逆向选择 后悔值 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]