创新竞赛中锦标赛与拍卖激励机制的比较研究:实验的方法  

Comparative Research of Tournament and Auction Mechanism in Innovation Race:An Experimental Study

作　　者：闫威[1] 罗雨鹤[1] 刘智慧[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《经济管理》2012年第3期133-143,共11页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目"不对称锦标赛环境下代理人拆台行为的实验研究"(11YJC790225);重庆大学中央高校基本科研业务费科研专项人文社会科学类面上项目"不对称锦标赛中的倾斜政策有效性研究"(CDJSK11 070)

摘　　要：何种激励方式能更好地促进创新,是理论界和实务界共同关注的问题。本文采用实验研究的方法,分析创新竞赛中锦标赛和拍卖两种激励机制对员工努力水平及收益的影响。利用对88个被试进行的8个实验,本文获得了如下研究结论:(1)锦标赛机制下,单独的竞赛规模因素不会对被试的努力水平产生显著影响,但对被试收取一定的入场费后,随着规模的扩大,被试的努力水平会有所降低;(2)在拍卖机制下,规模因素对被试的努力水平影响显著,且规模较小时是否限制竞价区间对被试竞价值没有显著的影响;(3)对两种激励机制下被试努力水平的比较分析发现,在竞赛规模较小时,拍卖机制下被试的努力水平和收益都优于锦标赛机制。规模较大时,锦标赛和拍卖机制的激励效果没有显著差异。There are two main incentive mechanisms in innovation race. One is tournament and the other is auction. Tournament has been studied by many scholars, in which the principal ranks all the agents by their final output. In tournaments, the agent with the highest output is the winner and thus rewarded by the principal with the predetermined bonus. Different from tournament, auction incentive mechanism not only based the ranking on quantity comparison but also took the price factor into account. Auction mechanism is more flexible and can reduce the costs for principal. In fact, even if the agent＇s final output in quantity is small compared to others, he stills stands good chance to win the race because he can bid for lower price. The question that which incentive mechanism can better promote innovation is highly concerned by both theo- rists and practitioners. This article adopted experimental research method to explore the incentive effect of the above two different mechanisms. To be more specific, it is intended to conduct an experimental study to investigate how tournament and auction incentive mechanism affect agents＇ effort and revenue. The three questions we try to answer in this article include： Concerning the incentive effect, is there any difference between tournament and auction mechanism in innovation race？ If we make some adjustments to the rule of innovation race, like introducing the entry fee in tournament and putting no restrictions on bidding price in auction, will agents＇ effort change according to such adjustments？ From the perspective of principal, which incentive mechanism will be of more value？ Eight experiments have been designed and carried out in this article, with the scale of racing （ the number of contestants in innovation race） , entry fee and bidding restriction as the main operating variables. We recruited 88 university undergraduate and graduate students as the subjects in this study. Based on the analysis of data collected from the above eight different experiments,

关 键 词：创新竞赛 锦标赛机制 拍卖机制 实验研究 

分 类 号：F243.4[经济管理—劳动经济] C931.2[经济管理—国民经济]