公共危机与地方财政运行机制的重构——基于财政机会主义的视角  

Public Crisis and the Reconstruction of Local Fiscal Operation Mechanism:from the Angle of Fiscal Opportunism

作　　者：周克清[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学财政税务学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《当代财经》2012年第3期25-33,共9页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：四川省社科基金项目"公共危机下的地方财政运行机制研究"(SC09C036)

摘　　要：近年来,我国频繁发生大型公共危机,严重影响了民众的生命财产安全与社会经济的可持续发展。我国公共危机防治的困境在一定程度上导源于地方财政的机会主义行为,而我国政府间激励约束机制不合理和财政管理体制不健全则是地方财政机会主义普遍存在的重要根源。从现实来看,地方财政机会主义的普遍存在不仅导致了公共危机的形成,而且加大了公共危机的治理难度,放大了其对社会经济运行的负面影响。为此,我国需要重构地方财政运行机制,建立有效的激励约束机制,合理界分政府间公共危机的防治责任,为地方政府配置有效的财力,并建立完善的地方财政监督机制。In recent years, many big public crises happened frequently in China, which have seri ously affected the life and property safety of the people and the sustainable development of the soci ety and economy. The difficulty in the prevention and treatment of the public crisis should be at tributed to the opportunism of the local finance, and the popularity of the latter was derided from the irrational incentive and restraint mechanism between the governments and the imperfect fiscal manage- ment system. In reality, the opportunism of the local finance not only leads to the formation of pub- lic crisis, but also increases the difficulty of governance of public crisis and magnifies the negative influence of the public crisis on the operation of society and economy. Therefore, it is necessary for China to reconstruct the local fiscal operation mechanism, establish an effective incentive and restraint mechanism, properly define the responsibilities of prevention and treatment of public crisis between the governments, allocate sufficient revenue to the local governments, and establish perfect local fiscal supervision mechanism.

关 键 词：公共危机 地方政府 财政机会主义 财政运行机制 

分 类 号：F812.7[经济管理—财政学]