我国上市公司正向盈余意外实现原因研究  

A Study of the Causes of Positive Earnings Surprise in China's Listed Companies

作　　者：王晶晶[1] 李若山[1] 李冬昕[2] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433 [2]南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《当代财经》2012年第3期101-113,共13页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自科基金重点项目“投资者利益保护的评价理论与方法”(70632002)

摘　　要：通过分析我国上市公司正向盈余意外的实现原因,发现我国上市公司高管没有通过盈余管理或预期管理实现正向盈余意外,除了业绩较好的情况外,上市公司正向盈余意外的另一原因是分析师为与上市公司高管建立或维持良好关系以便获得私有信息,迎合上市公司高管造成的。可见,我国上市公司与分析师之间存在利益冲突,且利益冲突的主要来源是上市公司的选择性信息披露。因此,为规范我国证券分析师行业的发展,有必要提高证券分析师的独立性,完善信息公平披露制度,提高违背公平信息披露规则的违规成本。This paper studies the causes of the positive earnings surprise in China＇s listed companies. It is found that except the companies with better performance, none of the management of China＇s listed companies has realized the positive earnings surprise through earnings management or expectation manage ment. The other cause is that in order to establish or maintain a good relationship with the management of the listed companies so as to gain some private information, the financial analysts try to appeal to the management. It is thus clear that there exist interest conflicts between the listed companies and financial analysts, and the root of the interest conflicts is the selective disclosure of information by the listed compa nies. Thus, in order to standardize the development of the profession of financial analysts, it is necessary to improve the independence of financial analysts, perfect the fair information disclosure system, and increase the cost of violation of the fair information disclosure rules.

关 键 词：上市公司 正向盈余意外 盈余管理 预期管理 

分 类 号：F234.3[经济管理—会计学]