双边市场视角下大型零售商行为研究述评  

Literature Review on Large-scale Retailer Behavior under the Perspective of Bilateral Markets

作　　者：韩耀[1] 原小能[1] 毛彦妮[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学国际经贸学院,江苏南京210003

出　　处：《北京工商大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第1期9-14,共6页JOURNAL OF BEIJING TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY:SOCIAL SCIENCES

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"基于全球服务价值链的我国现代服务业发展战略研究"(11CJL066)

摘　　要：经过以连锁经营和超级市场为标志的"零售革命",零售市场从原来的单边市场转变为双边市场,大型零售商也由单纯的销售终端转变为居于供应商和消费者之间的交易平台。作为平台企业,大型零售商采取非对称定价策略,向供应商收取通道费,对消费者则不收取除商品价格以外的额外费用,这一行为并不违背市场公平的原则。大型零售商按照平台为供应商创造的价值而收取通道费并没有损害供应商的利益,反过来还为供应商获得更大的利益创造了条件。大型零售商的价格策略源自于双边市场的交叉网络外部性,并且在外部性内化的过程中依然要受到市场约束,因而不同于一般的垄断,不属于政府规制的对象。After the ＂retail revolution＂ with the symbol of chain operation and supermarket,the retail market has changed from unilateral market to bilateral market.Moreover,large-scale retailers have changed from pure sales terminal to trade platform between suppliers and consumers.As platform enterprise,large-scale retailers take the asymmetric pricing strategy to collect the slotting allowance from suppliers but no additional fees from consumers except commodity price,the behavior of which does not violate the principle of fair market.Large-scale retailers collect the slotting allowance based on the value created by the platform,with no damage to the suppliers＇ interests but a promotion for suppliers＇ larger interests.The price strategy of large-scale retailers derives from the Cross-group Network Externalities of bilateral market and is subject to market constraint in the process of internalization of externalities.Therefore,it differs from generic monopoly and does not belong to the object of government regulation.

关 键 词：双边市场 平台企业 大型零售商 交叉网络外部性 非对称价格 通道费 

分 类 号：F724.2[经济管理—产业经济]