葛梯尔反例中的“偷天换日”  

Fallacy in Gettier's Counterexample

作　　者：陈积坚[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学人文学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《江苏海洋大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2012年第1期27-29,共3页Journal of Jiangsu Ocean University（Humanities & Social Sciences Edition）

摘　　要：通过对"谬误推理"与"二律背反"本质的阐释,尝试性地解决知识论中葛梯尔问题带来的挑战。简要地介绍了"葛梯尔反例"的背景以及一些相应的理论,分析了康德解决"谬误推理"和"二律背反"的原理、方法,通过对"葛梯尔反例"的再分析,得到其问题的实质在于认识论与形而上学的混淆,并提出相应的解决办法。Elucidation of the essence of ＇paralogism＇ and ＇antinomy＇ is made to sol tier＇s counterexample in epistemology. The background of Gettier＇s counterexam lated to it are introduced, and the methods and principles of Kant through which are analyzed. A reexamination of Gettier＇s counterexample shows that it mixes up aphysics. Finally, the author＇s solution to deal with the problem is proposed. ve the challenge of Get- ple and the theories re- he tackled the problem epistemology with metaphysics. Finally, the author＇s solution to deal with the problem is proposed.

关 键 词：谬误推理 二律背反 葛梯尔反例 

分 类 号：B815.3[哲学宗教—逻辑学]