政府主导下的土地流转路径模型——一个动态博弈的视角  

The Model of Government-led Land Transfer Path from a Perspective of a Dynamic Game

作　　者：陈珏宇[1] 姚东旻[2] 洪嘉聪[3] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院博士后流动站,100871 [2]中国人民大学经济学院,100872 [3]中国保险监督管理委员会稽查局,100140

出　　处：《经济评论》2012年第2期5-15,共11页Economic Review

摘　　要：本文通过建立一个政府土地政策制定与农民土地流转决策的两期动态博弈模型,先后探讨了在平均分配土地的配给规则以及最大化农业劳动人口的土地配给规则下的土地流转路径,并比较了两种配给规则下土地流转速率的大小,得出土地流转的根本原因是农民劳动能力不同以及政府行为前后不一致,从而揭示了影响土地流转速率的内在机制:农民的劳动能力存在差异,为土地流转提供了可能,政府因此可以制定使农民激励相容的土地政策,推动土地整合集中到劳动能力高的农民手中;非农工资水平、农业补贴等外部因素对土地流转的影响主要体现在土地收敛速率上,并不改变土地流转的方向和最终均衡结果。在此引入劳动力市场冲击之后,本文提出了以产量甄别农民劳动能力的方法,改进政府进行农业定向采购的方式。This paper draws the classic assumptions on foreign literature about the land transfer, distinguish the farmers with the farmers＇ work ability,taking fully considering the actual situation of non - agricultural employment, establishing a repeated infinitely many times game model between the government and farmers, establishing the path on the average allocation rules and allocation of land to maximize land with agricultural labor force, land transfer machine under the rules of the path, and comparative analysis of land transfer under two rationing rules for the size of the rate, analyzing local policies, internal and external factors which impact on the land transfer mechanism under the rules of Equitable distribution of land, getting some important conclusions that the root causes of land transfer is the difference of farmers＇ work ability and government behavior inconsistent, revealing the intrinsic rate of land transfer Mechanism. On this basis, the model is further expanded to explore the impact of joining the labor market and screening of government information.

关 键 词：农村土地流转 劳动能力 土地配给规则 

分 类 号：F321.1[经济管理—产业经济] F224.32