Energy-efficient power allocation for selfish cooperative communication networks using bargaining game  

作　　者：DING EnJie ZHANG GuoPeng LIU Peng YANG Kun 

机构地区：[1]CUMT-IoT Perception Mine Research Center,China University of Mining and Technology,Xuzhou 221116,China [2]School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering,University of Essex Wivenhoe Park,Colchester Essex,C043SQ,UK

出　　处：《Science China(Information Sciences)》2012年第4期795-804,共10页中国科学（信息科学）（英文版）

基　　金：supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No.60972059);Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of China (Grant No. 2010QNA27);China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (Grant No. 20100481185);Ph.D. Programs Foundation of Ministry of Education of China (Grant No.20110095120006);Talent Introduction Program and the Young Teacher Sailing Program of China University of Mining and Technology

摘　　要：In commercial networks, user nodes operating on batteries are assumed to be selfish to consume their energy solely to maximize their own benefits, e.g., data rates. In this paper, we propose a bargaining game to perform the power allocation for the selfish cooperative communication networks. In our system, two partner nodes can act as a source as well as a relay for each other, and each node is with an energy constraint to transmit one frame. Consider a selfish node is willing to seek cooperative transmission only if the data rate achieved through cooperation will not lower than that achieved through noncooperation by using the same amount of energy. The energy-efficient power allocation problem can be modeled as a cooperative game. We proved that there exists a unique Nash bargaining solution （NBS） for the game by verifying that the game is indeed a bargaining problem. Thus, the two objectives, i.e., system efficiency and user fairness specified in the selfish networks can be achieved. Simulation results show that the NBS scheme is efficient in that the performance loss of the NBS scheme to that of the maximal overall rate scheme is small while the maximal-rate scheme is unfair. The simulation results also show that the NBS result is fair in that both nodes could experience better performance than they work independently and the degree of cooperation of a node only depends on how much contribution its partner can make to improve its own performance.In commercial networks, user nodes operating on batteries are assumed to be selfish to consume their energy solely to maximize their own benefits, e.g., data rates. In this paper, we propose a bargaining game to perform the power allocation for the selfish cooperative communication networks. In our system, two partner nodes can act as a source as well as a relay for each other, and each node is with an energy constraint to transmit one frame. Consider a selfish node is willing to seek cooperative transmission only if the data rate achieved through cooperation will not lower than that achieved through noncooperation by using the same amount of energy. The energy-efficient power allocation problem can be modeled as a cooperative game. We proved that there exists a unique Nash bargaining solution （NBS） for the game by verifying that the game is indeed a bargaining problem. Thus, the two objectives, i.e., system efficiency and user fairness specified in the selfish networks can be achieved. Simulation results show that the NBS scheme is efficient in that the performance loss of the NBS scheme to that of the maximal overall rate scheme is small while the maximal-rate scheme is unfair. The simulation results also show that the NBS result is fair in that both nodes could experience better performance than they work independently and the degree of cooperation of a node only depends on how much contribution its partner can make to improve its own performance.

关 键 词：cooperative communication energy efficiency resource allocation cooperative game theory Nashbargaining solution 

分 类 号：TN929.533[电子电信—通信与信息系统] F224.32[电子电信—信息与通信工程]