基于LA型供应商的易逝品供应链价格补贴契约  

Perishable Product Supply Chain Markdown Money Contract with a Loss-averse Supplier

作　　者：孙多青[1,2] 张欢[1,3] 马晓英[1] 俞百印[1,3] 尹洪武[1,3] 刘岩[1,3] 

机构地区：[1]河北科技师范学院数学与系统科学研究所,河北秦皇岛066004 [2]北京航空航天大学数学与系统科学学院,北京100191 [3]河北科技师范学院数学与信息科技学院,河北秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《控制工程》2012年第2期360-364,共5页Control Engineering of China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71071010);河北省科学技术研究与发展计划项目(10457254);河北科技师范学院重点学科和科研创新团队建设经费资助项目(CXTD2010-05)

摘　　要：针对由单个损失厌恶型供应商和单个风险中性型零售商组成的供应链系统,在前景理论框架下,研究了存在缺货损失下的基于批发价格契约和价格补贴契约的易逝品供应链协调问题。首先分析了分散化供应链系统在批发价格契约下供应商和零售商的最优决策,并将供应商的最优生产量与集中化供应链系统下的最优生产量进行了比较;从理论上严格证明了当供应商的最优生产量小于集中化供应链系统下的最优生产量时,供应商不能通过批发价格契约使得自己的生产量为集中化供应链的生产量。然后分析了在缔结政府提供的价格补贴契约下供应商和零售商的最优决策。研究结果表明,损失厌恶型供应商在批发价格契约下的最优生产量可能偏离系统最优生产量,这时政府可以通过价格补贴契约来协调整个供应链。Under the prospect theory, for the supply chain with a loss-averse supplier and a risk-neutral retailer, the supply chain co- ordination issue with stockout lost in both the wholesale price contract and the markdown money contract is investigated. First, the re- tailer and the supplier~ optimal decisions are analyzed with the wholesale price contract under the decentralized supply chain, and then the optimal decisions of the supplier are compared with that obtained under the integrated supply chain. And it is theoretically proved that when the optimized quantity of supplier are smaller than that under the integrated supply chain, the supplier cannot make its output equal to the optimized output under the integrated supply chain by means of the wholesale price contract. Finally, the retailer and the supplier~ optimal decisions are analyzed under the markdown money contract which is provided by government. The study results show that, with stockout lost, the output from the loss-averse supplier may deviate from the optimized quantity of the system, and govern- ment can coordinate the supply chain by markdown money contract.

关 键 词：易逝品 供应链 协调 价格补贴契约 

分 类 号：TP27[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]