可分离物品多属性采购拍卖的最优机制  

Optimal mechanism of multi-attribute procurement auction for divisible goods

作　　者：饶从军[1,2] 赵勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学系统工程研究所,湖北武汉430074 [2]黄冈师范学院数学与计算机科学学院,湖北黄冈438000

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2012年第1期88-98,共11页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70771041);湖北省教育厅优秀中青年人才资助项目(Q2012)

摘　　要：研究了多属性前提下可分离物品的采购问题,设计了一个最优多属性采购拍卖机制.首先给出了可分离物品多属性采购拍卖的相关假设,定义了采购商和供应商的效用函数;其次,给出了一组可行多属性采购拍卖机制的充分条件,并以这些充分条件为前提、以采购商的期望效用最大化为目标,建立了可分离物品最优多属性采购拍卖的供应商选择模型,通过求解此模型得出最优的供应商和相应的供应量;再次,讨论了最优机制的基本性质;最后给出了一个航空煤油采购的多属性拍卖应用实例说明了如何实现本文设计的可分离物品最优多属性采购拍卖机制.The problem of divisible goods procurement under the condition of multiple attributes is studied, and an optimal mechanism of multi-attribute procurement auction is designed. Firstly, several important as- sumptions of multi-attribute procurement auction of divisible goods are given, and the buyer＇s utility function and the supplier＇s utility function are defined. Then, a set of sufficient conditions for feasible multi-attribute auction mechanism are given. Based on these conditions, an optimization model of selecting the suppliers in multi-attribute procurement auction whose goal is to maximize the buyer＇s expected utility is established. The optimal allocation strategies are obtained by solving this model. Moreover, the properties of the optimal mechanism are discussed. Finally, a multi-attribute auction example about the jet fuel procurement is given to show how to realize the optimal multi-attribute procurement auction mechanism.

关 键 词：关可分离物品 多属性采购拍卖 最优机制设计 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]