财政补贴政策与森林保险投保行为的博弈分析  

Analysis on the Relationship between Policies of Financial Subsidies and Behaviors of Forest Insurance Coverage Based on the Game Theory

作　　者：冯祥锦[1,2] 杨建州[1] 黄和亮[1] 

机构地区：[1]福建农林大学经济与管理学院,福州350002 [2]福建工程学院管理学院,福州350108

出　　处：《林业经济》2012年第2期71-73,共3页Forestry Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“基于边际机会成本定价的闽江流域森林环境资源价值评估研究”(编号:71073022);福建省社会科学规划一般项目“基于条件价值评估法的森林保险支付意愿研究”(编号:2011B038)

摘　　要：通过构建一个有同时选择的动态博弈模型来模拟政府、保险公司、森林经营者之间的策略选择，分析政府财政补贴政策与森林保险投保行为的关系：如果政府想摆脱目前森林保险的困境，实现社会福利最大化，就必须提供政策性森林保险制度，并给予实质性的财政补贴支持。A dynamic game model with decisions at the same time will be constructed in this paper in order to simulate the decision of strategies among the government, insurance company and the insured. In this game model, the relationship between the policies of financial subsidies and the behaviors of forest insurance coverage will be analyzed and a conclusion will be gotten that if the government wants to walk out the dilem- ma of the present forest insurance, the policies of forest insurance with financial subsidies should be provid- ed substantively.

关 键 词：财政补贴 森林保险 投保行为 博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F840.6F810