大股东控制的状态举证:或然性问题与控制权竞争  

Quote of Large Shareholders' Control Status:Probable Problem and Contest of Control Right

作　　者：宗计川[1] 赵旸[2] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学金融学院,辽宁大连116025 [2]东北财经大学研究生院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《改革》2012年第3期72-77,共6页Reform

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"大股东控制权合谋机制与利益分配渠道实证与实验研究"(批准号:71102088);教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目"上市公司股东投票出席率实证与实验研究"(批准号:09YJC790032)

摘　　要：大股东控制行为及其福利结果是公司治理研究与监管领域的一个核心内容。从股东关系、股权性质、持股比例与非比例控制类型等方面对大股东间是相互制衡还是合谋,或者说还存在其他的关系进行探讨的结果表明,大股东相互制衡是一种"踮脚"均衡,并不稳定,所谓的制衡更有可能是控制权竞争的一种表现形式;大股东控制关系更多表现为合谋与控制权竞争。Behavior and welfare analysis related to large shareholders has been the focus in the field of CG research and monitor practice.In perspective of shareholders＇ relation,equity characteristic,equity distribution and non-proportional control type,the control relationship among large shareholders has been re-reviewed to make the monitor practice and research more objective.Counterbalance or collusion,also any kind of relationship exits,which is the topic here want to discuss.The discussion in this paper illustrate that the so called counterbalance is one kind of ＂TIPPY＂ equilibrium,tend to be alternative of control right contest.In higher probability,counterbalance and collusion can be observed among large shareholders.

关 键 词：大股东控制 控制权竞争 公司治理 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]