博弈原理在解决交通拥挤中的分析  

Analysis on Game Theory in Traffic Congestion

作　　者：董甜甜[1] 谭建春 

机构地区：[1]重庆师范大学经济管理学院 [2]审计处,重庆401331

出　　处：《重庆师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2012年第2期99-102,共4页Journal of Chongqing Normal University:Natural Science

摘　　要：随着城市化与机动化的全面推进,我国大城市的交通拥挤现象日益突出。为探讨政府采用何种经济手段缓解交通拥堵更加合理,本文运用混合博弈的方法对政府和出行者两个博弈主体进行分析,从政府单纯征收拥堵税或进行公交补贴及两种策略共同实施的角度对出行者的出行行为选择进行研究,通过运用混合战略模型中的效用函数公式vi(σi,σ-i=∑s∈S)(∏σi(Si) j=1 n)ui(s)综合分析政府和出行者的期望效用,探讨出政府通过经济政策来缓解交通s∈Sj=1拥堵的本质是引导私人小汽车向公共交通出行转变。在此基础上,本文提出对私家车征收交通拥挤税、向公共交通出行者提供经济补偿对缓解大城市高峰时期交通拥堵具有更加明显的效果,同时应将拥挤税税额限定在合理的范围之内。本文的研究结论为大城市解决交通拥堵提供了可借鉴和参考的依据。As both the urbanization and motorization promoted rapidly in our city, the phenomenon of traffic jams in our big cities were serious than ever before. In order to help the government find out a kind of better economic means to solve traffic jams, this paper used the method of game to analyze the government and passengers, studied on the behaviors of the passengers on adopting collecting the traffic jams tax or giving bus subsidy or both methods adopt at t/le same time, got the conclusion that the essence of government adop- ting economic policy to solve traffic jams is to guide private car turn to public transportation. On this foundation, this paper put forward that adopting both collecting the traffic jams tax and giving subsidy have a better effect. At the same time the traffic jams tax should be limited in a reasonable range. The conclusion of this paper could provide the basis to solve the traffic jams in the big cities.

关 键 词：交通拥挤现象 混合博弈 交通拥堵 原理 公共交通 经济政策 出行者 私人小汽车 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]