任务重要性、产出关联性与创业投资家的激励机制研究  

Task Importance,Output Correlation and Incentive Mechanism for Venture Capitalists

作　　者：熊维勤[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆工商大学长江上游经济研究中心产业经济研究院,重庆400067

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2012年第1期248-255,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(09YJC790279);国家社科基金重点项目(08AJY028)

摘　　要：针对我国创业投资基金运作中独特的制度安排,对创业投资家在多任务环境下的激励问题进行了研究。Holmstrom和Milgrom的经典理论认为:若代理人在多任务中的努力投入可替代,则不同任务间的激励强度必须互补。然而本文的理论分析表明:1)若任务间的重要性存在差异,则最优的激励合约要求委托人增加重要任务的激励强度,同时降低其它任务的激励强度,即任务间的激励必然是对抗性的;2)若产出的分布受共同冲击的影响(正相关),则当任务间努力投入的替代系数较小时,应该对代理人实施对抗性激励,反之应对代理人实施互补性激励。对抗性激励机制的存在为委托人在某些环境下对高风险但重要任务实施强激励提供了理论依据。The multi-task incentive scheme for venture capitalists is studied based on some unique institutional arrangements emerging in Chinese venture capital funds.A classical theory proved by Holmstrom and Milgrom indicates that if efforts allocated among tasks are substitutable,then the incentive intensity of different task must be complementary.However,our theoretical analysis shows that： 1）If the importance of task difference,the optimal contract should increase incentive strength of the important task while reducing the incentive intensity of other tasks,that is,the incentive intensity of different task must be opponent.2）If the distribution of outputs are effected by a common shock（positive correlation）,then opponent incentive scheme is optimum when substitute coefficient of efforts is small,otherwise,complementary incentive scheme is better.The existence of antagonistic incentives provides a theoretical basis for principal to carry out strong incentive for some high-risk but important tasks.

关 键 词：创业投资基金 互补性激励 对抗性激励 多任务代理问题 

分 类 号：C936[经济管理—管理学]