不完备偏好扩展式博弈的序贯均衡  

Sequential Equilibrium in Extensive Games with Incomplete Preferences

作　　者：时奇[1,2] 谌贻庆[1] 

机构地区：[1]南昌大学经济与管理学院,江西南昌330031 [2]上海财经大学经济学院,上海200433

出　　处：《经济数学》2012年第1期38-41,共4页Journal of Quantitative Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(11BJY045)

摘　　要：将Kreps和Wilson提出的序贯均衡解概念推广到了存在不完备偏好的情形.首先给出了一个修正的颤抖手完美均衡的概念,然后应用它去证明不完备偏好扩展式博弈序贯均衡的存在性.The Kreps and Wilson＇s solution concept of sequential equilibrium was generalized to the extensive games with incomplete preferences. First a revised concept of trembling hand perfect equilibrium was given, and then was applied to verify the existence of sequential equilibrium in extensive games with incomplete preferences.

关 键 词：博弈 不完备偏好 序贯均衡 纳什均衡 颤抖手完美均衡 

分 类 号：F016[经济管理—政治经济学]