风险企业融资行为的逆向选择博弈模型研究  

Study of Adverse Selection Model of Venture Enterprise Financing Behavior

作　　者：张新立[1] 詹丽萍[1] 杨玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]辽宁师范大学数学学院,辽宁大连116029

出　　处：《经济数学》2012年第1期52-55,共4页Journal of Quantitative Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学项目(10YJC630395;09YJC630213)

摘　　要：利用博弈论理论建立了风险企业融资行为的逆向选择信号传递博弈模型,分完全信息和不完全信息两种情况,对影响风险投资家努力水平的因素进行了分析,得出产权结构不合理、控制权分配失衡和风险企业家的寻租行为是造成风险投资家努力水平不高的主要原因,并给出了相应的对策建议.On the basis of game theory, this paper set up a signaling model of adverse selection about venture enterprise financing behavior. Under complete information and imcomplete information, the factors affecting venture capitalist＇s effort level were analyzed. As a result, improper property rights structure, imbalance o5 control rights and entrepreneur＇s lease acts are the main reasons of why venture capitalisfs effort level is not high. The relevant suggestions were proposed to improve venture capitalist＇s effort level.

关 键 词：风险企业 融资行为 逆向选择 信号传递模型 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]