制造业与物流业联动发展的演化博弈分析  

Analysis on the Evolutionary Game of Interactive Development between Manufacturing and Logistics Industry

作　　者：王珍珍[1] 陈功玉[2] 

机构地区：[1]福建师范大学,福州350007 [2]中山大学,广州510275

出　　处：《中国经济问题》2012年第2期86-97,共12页China Economic Studies

基　　金：2012年教育部人文社会科学基金青年项目<制造业与物流业联动发展的机理与模式研究--基于产业共生理论>;中山大学重大项目培育和新兴;交叉学科项目<物流与供应链管理的协同理论与关键技术研究>

摘　　要：制造业与物流业联动发展中合作与竞争关系并存。文章从博弈双方有限理性的假设前提出发,构建制造企业与物流企业联动发展的演化博弈模型。在此基础上,引入了政府行为,构建制造企业与物流企业在政府补贴机制下的演化博弈策略以及政府与企业之间的演化博弈模型并通过数值模拟描述了具体的演化路径及影响因素。经分析得出,制造企业与物流企业联动发展的系统具有鲜明的"路径依赖"的特征,这种演化路径受到模型的初始状态、联动发展的投入成本、联动发展的额外收益、一方不积极实施联动发展给另外一方造成的损失、政府的补贴及惩罚机制等的影响。合作竞争关系贯穿着联动发展的始末,政府应"因势利导",实现制造企业与物流企业在联动发展过程中供给和需求的匹配。The relationship between manufacturing and logistics industries is changing with cooperation and competition. The thesis builds up the evolutionary game theory between manufacturing and logistics industry based on the limited rational a nalysis and tried to find the influence factors of the evolutionary routes. Based on this, we take the government＇s policy into con sideration and analyze the evolutionary stability strategy. We conclude that there is path dependence character during the inter active development between manufacturing and logistics industry. Whether the enterprises will take the measures are affected by the beneficial factors and limited factors. The coopetition is the nature of the system; the government shall encourage the inter- active development to make the matching between manufacturing and logistics industry.

关 键 词：制造业与物流业 联动发展 演化博弈 稳定性分析 

分 类 号：F424[经济管理—产业经济] F259.2F224.32