基于随机需求与回收的逆向供应链奖惩机制  

Premium and penalty mechanism of reverse supply chain with stochastic demand and collection

作　　者：曹柬[1,2] 胡强[1] 楼婷渊[1] 周根贵[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江工业大学经贸管理学院,浙江杭州310032 [2]浙江大学管理学院,浙江杭州310058

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2012年第3期597-608,共12页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172182;71071142);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(20110490179);浙江省软科学研究资助项目(2011C35030)~~

摘　　要：针对由制造商、加工商和回收商构成的三级逆向供应链系统,基于博弈理论建立了需求与回收双重不确定环境下以制造商为领导者的Stackelberg模型。设计了制造商与加工商、加工商与回收商之间的目标奖惩合同,结合实践提出了逆向供应链运作中四种不同的成员间的奖惩激励方式,比较分析了各种奖惩方式对系统最优决策的影响。采用数值仿真讨论了各类参数与逆向供应链成员期望利润之间的关系。研究结论对逆向供应链的运营实践具有很好的现实指导意义。For the three-level Reverse Supply Chain（ RSC） system including a manufacturer, a processor and a collec- tor, a manufacturer-leading Staekelberg model was established with uncertainties of both demand and collection based on game theory. The premium and penalty contracts between manufacturer and processor, processor and col- lector were designed separately. Combined with actual operation situation, four kinds of premium and penalty incen- tive mechanisms in RSC operation were proposed, and influences of proposed mechanisms to the optimal strategies of RSC were discussed. The relationships between the members＇ expected profits and various parameters were dis- cussed by numerical simulation. The conclusions were helpful to guide the actual operation of RSC.

关 键 词：逆向供应链 随机需求与回收 奖惩机制 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]