地方政府过度举债、风险累积和治理对策  

Excessive Issuance,Cumulative Risks and Governance Strategies of Local Government Debt

作　　者：方先明[1] 张谊浩[1] 蒋彧[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院讲师,南京210093

出　　处：《中国行政管理》2012年第4期109-113,共5页Chinese Public Administration

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目(项目编号:09YJC790146);教育部哲学社会科学创新基地“南京大学经济转型和发展研究中心”课题“对外开放与中国经济转型及发展研究”的资助;国家社会科学基金重点项目(项目编号:08AJY029)

摘　　要：当前我国地方政府出现了过度举债现象,表现出债务形式日趋复杂,规模大幅扩张,余额增速明显,结构相对失衡的特征。地方政府过度举债的原因在于分税制改革后的不配套、地方干部任命与考核制度、决策机制不完善、法制约束力不够等。地方政府过度举债特别是各级地方政府融资平台的迅速扩张势必诱发各种风险,进而阻碍地方经济发展。为此,文章针对地方政府过度举债及其风险累积,提出兼具科学性及可操作性的治理对策。Recently, China＇ s local government has been emerging the phenomenon of excessive issuance of local bonds, showing the characteristics of increasingly complicated forms, largescale expansion, significant growth of balance and relatively unbal anced structure. Factors leading to excessive issuance of local bonds include non supporting after tax system reform, appointment and examination system of local officials, inadequate decision making mechanism, not enough law constraints, and so on. Excessive issuance of local bonds, especially the rapid expansion of financing platform of local government, will lead to a variety of risks, and then slow down the development of local economy. This paper discusses about the scientific and operational governance strategies against the excessive issuance of local bonds and its corresponding cumulative risks.

关 键 词：地方政府 政府债务 风险累积 

分 类 号：F812.5[经济管理—财政学] F821.7