清朝时期晋商票号“股份制”经营探微  

Exploration on the Operation Pattern of In the Qing Dynasty "Stock System" in Exchange Shops of the Jin Businessman

作　　者：康晶晶[1] 张增强[2] 

机构地区：[1]河北经贸大学商学院,河北石家庄050061 [2]河北经贸大学期刊编辑部,河北石家庄050061

出　　处：《经济与管理》2012年第3期44-46,共3页Economy and Management

摘　　要：票号的"两权分离"和"人力资本持股"是明清晋商经营管理制度中两个重要的创新,它使票号得以迅猛发展。但同时又成为票号衰败的缘由之一:一方面,由于两权分离制度中财东的过分放权并缺乏对经理有效的制约,使得代理成本、道德风险不断增加,从而威胁了票号的健康发展;另一方面,人力资本股制度由于没有合理有效地控制,最终使得人身股份额大大超过了资本股份额,组织内部的权责利出现了明显的不对等。这些都加速了票号的衰亡。The ＂two rights separation＂ and ＂human capital holdings＂ are two important innovations of business management system in exchange shops of Jin businessman,it makes the exchange shops develop rapidly.But at the same time,they become one of the reasons for the decline of exchange shops,that are on the one hand,the too decentralization of the shop owners in the two right separation system and lack of effective restrictions to managers,which makes the agency cost and moral risk increase,and then threat the healthy development of the exchange shops;on the other hand,with no reasonable effective control,eventually stock share of the human capital is more than capital share,,there is an obvious unequal in the responsibility,obligation and interest of the internal organize,etc.These all accelerate the fall of exchange shops.

关 键 词：票号 “股份制” 两权分离 人力资本股 

分 类 号：F092.2[经济管理—政治经济学]