基于Cobb-Douglas效用函数的多属性采购拍卖  

Multi-attribute procurement auctions based on Cobb-Douglas utility function

作　　者：李军[1] 刘树林[1] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院,北京100029

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2012年第3期54-60,共7页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171052)

摘　　要：在多属性采购拍卖的实践中,利润和赢得合同对供给者来说具有不同的重要性.假设供给者使用Cobb-Douglas效用函数对利润和赢得合同的重要性程度进行权衡,在第一评分拍卖及第二评分拍卖下获得了供给者的均衡投标策略和采购者的期望效用,并对采购者的期望效用进行了比较.结果表明供给者对被采购物品的质量选择只与自己的成本参数和打分函数有关;当供给者越看重获取采购合同,采购者的期望效用越高;当采购者只能使用效用函数打分时,如果供给者更看重利润,采购者应该采用第二评分拍卖节约采购成本,否则使用第一评分拍卖.In practical multi-attribute procurement auctions, profit and winning a contract have different impli- cations for different suppliers. This paper assumes that the suppliers weight profit and winning a contract with Cobb-Douglas utility function, obtain the equilibrium bidding strategies of the suppliers and procurer＇ expec- ted utilities in the first- and second-score auctions, and compares them with those under risk-neutral assump- tion. The quality depends only on the cost parameters of providers and the scoring function, the more weights on the winning probability, the higher the expected utilities the buyer obtains. When the only feasible scoring rule is the buyer＇ s utility function, the buyer should use second-score auction to cut cost if suppliers weigh profit heavily, otherwise the buyer should use first-score auction.

关 键 词：政府采购 Cobb-Douglas效用函数 多属性采购拍卖 第一评分拍卖 第二评分拍卖 

分 类 号：F253.2[经济管理—国民经济]