政府干预、地方国有企业募资变更后投向与公司价值  

Government Intervention,the Investment after the Changes of Committed Investment Orientation of Local State-owned Companies and the Companies' Value

作　　者：曹春方[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学公司治理研究中心商学院,天津300071

出　　处：《经济管理》2012年第4期1-10,共10页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大招标课题"完善国有控股金融机构公司治理研究"(10zd&035);教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目"投资者关系管理对公司治理的优化效果研究"(10JJD630001);国家自然科学基金重点课题"我国集团企业跨国治理与评价研究"(71132001)

摘　　要：以往的文献很少关注募资变更之后的投向,从而使得募资变更如何导致公司价值下降成为"黑箱"。本文选取2000～2008年地方国有上市公司为样本,从政府干预下募资变更后投向的角度解开部分"黑箱"。我们从晋升激励、财政激励和社会稳定等方面构建政府多重目标的干预指数,发现政府干预越强,募资变更几率越大;政府干预下公司募资变更后更易投向固定投资,最终降低公司价值。进一步发现,固定投资的资金是否来自募资变更并不能影响公司价值,降低公司价值的关键原因在于政府干预;政府干预之下公司进行的募资变更和固定投资均降低了公司价值,而募资变更是政府干预下公司进行固定投资的主要途径之一。本文从募资变更投向角度揭示了政府对企业"掠夺之手"的具体路径,有助于加深我们对政府干预企业的认识。Raising money through stock issuance is an important capital source of listed companies＇ invest- ments. However, many companies＇ investments are not according to the commitment in the stock issue prospectus. Although considerable literatures found that the changes ofcommitted investment orientation can cause the reduction of companies＇ value, the researchers have paid little attention to the investments after the orientation changes, which turns the pathway of committed investment orientation＇s changes reducing companies＇ value into a ＂black box＂. By observing the data of local state-owned listed companies from the year 2000 to 2008, this paper tries to part- ly unlock the ＂black box＂ from the perspective of investment after the changes of committed investment orientation. Local governments concern about the officials＇ promotion, fiscal revenue and social stability. So, local govern- ments tend to intervene in the enterprises under the above incentives. And the local state-owned enterprises, due to their majority of the shares belonged to local governments and the managers directly appointedby the local govern- ments, are the focus of government intervention. We build a local government intervention index of multi-targets, which consists of moving average GDP growth, fiscal revenue, unemployment rate, and find that when government intervention is strong, the probability of investment orientation changes will increase. Evidence shows that local state-owned enterprises will add fixed assets investment after the investment orienta- tion changes under the government intervention. This is because that fixed assets investment will meet the multi-tar- gets of local government. Firstly, as the main driving force of the economic growth in China, fixed assets investment can increase the promotion probability of the officials. Secondly, the fixed assets investment will get more tax base which canincrease the fiscal revenue. Thirdly, the fixed assets investment will increase the employment. From the ev

关 键 词：政府干预 募资变更 固定投资 掠夺之手 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]