网络舆情政府干预最佳点选择的研究  

A Research About the Best Time Points for the Government to Intervene Network Public Opinion

作　　者：谌楠[1] 王恒山[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学系统工程系,上海200093

出　　处：《现代图书情报技术》2012年第3期53-58,共6页New Technology of Library and Information Service

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"非常规突发事件的网络信息传播规律与预警机制研究"(项目编号:71071098);上海市重点学科基金项目"管理科学与工程"(项目编号:S30504);上海市研究生创新基金项目"微博热点事件传播机制的研究"(项目编号:JWCXSL1102)的研究成果之一

摘　　要：在BA无标度网络中引入社会福利博弈模型,建立动态舆论演化博弈模型,研究传播率对舆论演化的影响,并仿真上述博弈模型,探讨政府进入舆情传播的时机的优劣。结果表明,政府介入舆情传播并不是越早越好,因为传播比例、政府介入的时机会共同作用影响舆情的传播趋势;并且小世界性更利于信息的共享而使舆情传播的态势趋于平稳和明朗,这值得政府加以利用。This paper introduces the traditional social -welfare game model into the BA scale -free network to find out the relationship between the model and the evolutionary process of the public opinion. Taking into account of the study and imitative behaviors to the other gamers in the information structure, it carries on the simulation experiment, and gets the conclusion that small - world effects have positive impact on the information communication and gambling result, so it is a useful tool for government, while propagation speed and the opportunity when the government should control the public opinion are cooperated to influence the information dissemination. In a word, it is not that the earlier the government steps in, the better result we can see.

关 键 词：社会福利博弈模型 无标度网络 网络舆情 动态演化 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学] F49[政治法律—中外政治制度]