从个体理性到集体非理性:金融竞争与维权中的“囚徒困境”  

From Individual Rationality to Collective Irrationality:Prisoner's Dilemma in Financial Competition and Right Maintenance

作　　者：李少伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行威海市中心支行,山东威海264200

出　　处：《金融发展研究》2012年第3期57-60,共4页Journal Of Financial Development Research

摘　　要：在市场博弈中,以自身利益最大化为目标的策略安排本是一种理性选择,但这种理性选择并不一定总能实现自身收益最大化,有时这种个体理性可能会导致集体非理性的结局。本文通过对威海市金融竞争和维权过程中因银行自利行为导致信贷风险产生、爆发并最终使金融债务大量悬空的个案描述,分析"囚徒困境"现象是导致这一非理性均衡结果的主要原因,指出类似的"囚徒困境"现象在一定条件下完全可以通过检查和监管等手段减少或避免发生。In the market game, the strategies that maximize their own interests rational choice of the arrangement, but not always a rational choice to achieve their maximum efficiency, and sometimes, the individual rationality may lead to ap- pear irrational collective outcome. This paper analyzes the Weihai case of banks competition and the rights which ultimately cause the outbreak of large floating debt, and points out that ＂Prisoner＇s Dilemma＂ is the main reason for non-rational equilibrium and the similar situation can be avoided by regulatory constraints and supervision.

关 键 词：金融竞争 维权 囚徒困境 案例 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]