基于定价博弈的城际客运交通价格管制分析  

An Analysis of Intercity Passenger Transportation Price Control Based on Pricing Game

作　　者：吴麟麟[1] 卢海琴[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏大学汽车与交通工程学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《江苏大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第2期89-92,共4页Journal of Jiangsu University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学基金项目(11YJA630152);全国统计科学研究计划项目(2010LC53);江苏省六大人才高峰项目

摘　　要：针对城市群城际客运双头垄断市场寡头间可能采取的自由竞争和相互勾结这两种定价博弈可能,利用均衡理论和乘客出行广义费用模型,分析采取投资回报率管制和价格上限管制两种措施对城际客运交通结构的影响,能探讨城际客运交通价格管制策略,达到优化客运交通结构的目的。两种管制方法综合使用能鼓励有效投资,利于城际客运交通结构的优化。The equilibrium theory and generalized expense model of public transportation are used to analyze the influence of investment return rate and price cap regulation on intercity passenger transportation structure so as to seek out the control strategy about inter-city passenger transportation price and optimize the structure of passenger transport,in face of the two possible pricing games of free competition and collusion that may be adopted by the intercity passenger transportation duopoly market oligarchs in urban agglomeration.The combination of the two regulations can promote effective investment and optimize intercity passenger transportation structure.

关 键 词：价格管制 均衡理论 城际客运 定价博弈 双头垄断 

分 类 号：F572.88[经济管理—产业经济]