博弈论在弹道导弹核潜艇威慑能力定性评估中的应用  

Application of Game Theory in Qualitative Evaluation of Deterrent Capability of SSBN

作　　者：李世令[1] 孙东平[1] 周宝林[1] 

机构地区：[1]海军潜艇学院,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《装备环境工程》2012年第2期61-63,78,共4页Equipment Environmental Engineering

摘　　要：以国际政治经济学领域常用的博弈论为基础,建立了不同情况下的弹道导弹核潜艇核威慑能力的定性分析模型,其核心是分析威慑双方的策略互动,以便能够更加客观地对弹道导弹核潜艇的威慑能力进行评估。针对信息完全和信息缺失的情况,博弈论模型能够简便快捷地对弹道导弹核潜艇的核威慑效果进行评估,并能够提出提高潜艇威慑效果的具体措施。On the basis of international plutonomy＇ s game theory, a qualitative analysis model of SSBN nuclear deterrent capability was established at different instances. The model＇ s core is analyzing the strategic interaction of opposing party and impersonally estimating deterrent capability of SSBN. According to two conditions of enough and absent information, the game theory model can briefly and quickly evaluate deterrent effect of SSBN, and give some advice to enhance deterrent capability of SSBN.

关 键 词：博弈论 弹道导弹核潜艇 威慑评估 

分 类 号：E817[军事—战略学]