不完全信息下的征地补偿议价模型  

Research on compensation for land expropriation based bargaining model

作　　者：张明善[1] 罗玉琳[1] 姚珣[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南民族大学管理学院,四川成都610041

出　　处：《西南民族大学学报（自然科学版）》2012年第2期294-298,共5页Journal of Southwest Minzu University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(11XGL009);教育部人文社科项目(10YJA630207)

摘　　要：现行的征地补偿模式存在补偿标准过低、农民参与权缺失等缺陷,导致征地补偿问题成为征地纠纷频发和失地农民不满的焦点.在农民对征地价格具有参与权的前提下,运用不完全信息下的议价模型分析农民和地方政府交易成功的条件,并得出农民议价能力与其所获补偿之间的关系;为使农民和政府的利益总效用最大化,在交易成功的前提下,对议价模型进行了拓展.The present compensation system for land expropriation has such shortcomings as extremely low compensation,farmer＇s lack of participation.land The result is that compensation becomes the focus of frequent land disputes and landless peasants＇ discontent.Under the premise that farmers have the right to participate in land compensation,this paper uses incomplete information bargaining model to analyze conditions for farmers and local government to succeed in trade,and points out the relationship between bargaining power of farmers and their compensation.To maximize the total utility of farmers and the government,we analyze the expansion model further.

关 键 词：征地补偿 不完全信息静态博弈 议价模型 静态贝叶斯博弈 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]