电子商务信用缺失的博弈分析  

A Game Analysis of Electronic Commerce Discredit

作　　者：王康[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学理学院,广州510641

出　　处：《科学技术与工程》2012年第10期2505-2509,共5页Science Technology and Engineering

摘　　要：从信息不对称的角度建立电子商务信用行为的博弈模型,分析了目前我国电子商务信用缺失的原因,并提出了现时期改善我国电子商务信用问题的一些途径。电子商务信用缺失的主要原因有两点:一是没有形成完善的信用奖惩机制;二是在我国信息传递的难度相当大,电子商务获取信用信息的成本高昂。解决我国电子商务信用问题,首先应当加快我国信用市场体系的建设,建立电子商务信用的相关法律和地方法规;进一步完善现代电子商务制度,建立电子商务信用管理机制;建立信用信息系统,完善市场交易的信息沟通网络。A game model of electronic commerce credit is built from the view of information asymmetry, and the reason of our country electronic commerce discredit is analyzed, and some ways to improve China^s electronic commerce credit problems in the present period are proposed. There are two main reasons in electronic commerce discredit： one is there is not a perfect credit punishment mechanism; the other is information transfer is quite diffi- cult in our country, electronic commerce credit information cost a lot. To solve our country electronic commerce credit problems, the construction of market system of our country credit should be accelerated, the laws and local regulations of electronic commerce credit shonld be established; the modern electronic commerce system should be improved, the management mechanism of electronic commerce credit should be established; the credit information system, the information communication network of market transaction should be improved.

关 键 词：电子商务信用 信息不对称 博弈分析 委托-代理机制 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]