论医疗救助制度运行中的道德风险及防范  

Moral Hazard and Prevention in the Medicaid System Running

作　　者：周良荣[1] 颜文健[1] 陈礼平[1] 沈燕[2] 

机构地区：[1]南华大学政治与公共管理学院,湖南衡阳421001 [2]南华大学公共卫生学院

出　　处：《南华大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第1期37-40,共4页Journal of University of South China(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大研究项目"社会保障与和谐社会研究"资助(编号:07JJD840192)

摘　　要：医疗救助制度的运行过程中,道德风险源自医疗救助制度的执行主体与相关利益主体追求自身效用最大化的倾向。"上有政策,下有对策"是执行主体道德风险的表现形式;"搭便车"现象则是相关利益主体道德风险的形式。以信息共享破解信息不对称,重构医疗救助制度的他律体系,用道德自律约束相关利益主体,是有效防范医疗救助制度运行过程中道德风险的策略。During operation of the Medicaid system, moral hazard comes from the Medicaid system implementers and stakeholders pursuing their own utility maximization. ＂There are policies, localities have their counter-measures ＂is the manifestation of performer＇s moral risk;＂ Free riding ＂phenomena are the forms of moral hazard. Information-sharing to crack asymmetric information, recon- struction of discipline system of medical assistance system, using moral self-discipline to restrict related subjects of interest, these policies will effectively guard against the moral risk of medical aid system.

关 键 词：医疗救助 制度运行 道德风险 防范 

分 类 号：C913.7[经济管理]