偏好私密时的信息获取与传递(英文)  

Information acquisition and transmission under private preferences

作　　者：卢光松[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽建筑工业学院管理学院,安徽合肥230022

出　　处：《中国科学技术大学学报》2012年第3期234-242,共9页JUSTC

基　　金：Supported by the Natural Science Foundation of the Education Department of Anhui Province of China(KJ2010A062)

摘　　要：分析了策略性信息获取与信息传递问题.决策者就一个不确定二分决策问题委托多名专家获取与报告信息,假定决策者与专家的偏好信息都是私密的.首先得出了在所有专家都获取信息且如实报告的前提下决策者应该委托的最优专家数量,然后给出了所有专家都获取信息且如实报告的必要条件,并从专家根据自己的报告对最终决策具有实质性影响的概率选择各自策略的角度对该条件进行了讨论.The problem of strategic information acquisition and information transmission was analyzed. A decision maker delegated multiple experts to acquire and report information regarding an uncertain dichotomous decision problem. The preferences of the decision maker and theexperts were assumed to be private. The optimal number ot experts which the decision maker should delegate was derived providing that all experts acquire information and report truthfully. Then the prerequisite for all experts gathering and reporting informatively was identified. And the conditions were discussed with the point of view that experts choose their strategies based on their probabilities of making a difference in the final decision.

关 键 词：决策 信息获取 信息传递 偏好 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]