森林保险投保行为博弈分析  

Analysis on the behaviors of forest insurance coverage

作　　者：冯祥锦[1,2] 黄和亮[1] 杨建州[1] 

机构地区：[1]福建农林大学经济与管理学院,福建福州350002 [2]福建工程学院管理学院,福建福州350108

出　　处：《福建农林大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2012年第2期59-62,共4页Journal of Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：福建省社会科学规划一般项目(2011B038);福建省教育厅A类人文社科研究项目(JA11194S)

摘　　要：兼业农户是南方集体林区主要林业经营主体和森林保险投保主体之一,具有理性层次低、学习能力弱和模仿成功策略能力较差的特征。通过构建由较大群体组成,且群体成员之间随机配对的博弈模型,说明兼业农户之间相互模仿、学习等动态调整过程,并分析其进化稳定策略,得出结论:(1)博弈均衡的结果及博弈调整的速度不仅与博弈方的理性层次有关,还与博弈的分布方式有关。(2)所有农户都选择"投保"策略和所有农户都选择"不投保"策略均为该博弈的进化稳定策略,各种情况可能性大小取决于森林保险制度的效率。(3)基于兼业农户特性和博弈的进化稳定策略,任由兼业农户自主选择森林保险的制度安排将缺乏效率,需要政府的干预。Farmer households in part-time operation are main managers of southern collective forestry and the main bodies of forest insurance coverage,with the characteristics of whose rationality level is low and whose abilities of study and simulation of the successful strategies are poor.A game model is constructed,consisting of a great number of members with random partnership,to illustrate a dynamic coordinated process in which the part-time managers simulate and learn each other,and to analyze its evolutionary stable strategy.Accordingly several conclusions have been obtained as follows.（1） The outcome of equilibrium and the speed of adjustment not only depend on the rationality level of the players but also depend on the way of distribution of the game.（2） All farmer households selecting the forest insurance and refusing it are evolutionary stable strategy of the game,the possibility of which depends on the efficiency of forest insurance system.（3） In view of the characteristics of the farmer households in part-time operation and the evolutionary stable strategy of the game,the institutional arrangement will be inefficient if the farmers select the forest insurance by themselves.This institutional arrangement of the forest insurance needs the government intervention.

关 键 词：森林保险 投保行为 博弈 

分 类 号：F307.2[经济管理—产业经济]