发电侧与供电侧分时电价动态博弈联动研究  

Dynamic game linkage of TOU pricing between generating side and retail side

作　　者：李俊[1] 刘俊勇[1] 谢连芳[2] 权衡[1] 刘友波[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学电气信息学院,四川成都610065 [2]四川省电力公司,四川成都610041

出　　处：《电力自动化设备》2012年第4期16-19,共4页Electric Power Automation Equipment

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(50977059)~~

摘　　要：需求侧分时电价实施后,带来的系统效益需要通过电价进行传递和分配。利用博弈信号传递理论,构建了发电侧和需求侧分时电价动态博弈联动模型,该模型通过动态联动均衡实现削峰填谷效益在系统内各环节的市场化分配。算例仿真证明,模型能根据系统各环节的市场力大小,通过电价信号传递,客观分配分时电价带来的削峰填谷效益,能有效地规避供电侧风险和激励供电侧实施分时电价。The system benefits brought by TOU（Time-Of-Use） pricing need to be passed and distributed via electricity price. Based on the game theory of signal transmission,a dynamic linkage model of TOU pricing between generating side and retail side is established to realize the market-oriented distribution of benefits among different links of power system by dynamic linkage equilibrium. Case study shows that,the benefits brought by TOU pricing are objectively distributed via price signal transmission,which effectively avoids the risk of retail-side and encourages the implementation of TOU pricing at retail side.

关 键 词：电力市场 价格 电价联动 信号传递 分时电价 需求侧管理 动态电价 负荷管理 

分 类 号：TM77[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]