排斥性金融司法的考量与改进  

The Examination and Improvement of Exclusive Financial Justice

作　　者：王振栋[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学法学院,上海200433

出　　处：《上海财经大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2012年第2期27-34,共8页Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部哲学社会科学重大课题攻关项目<国际金融中心法制环境研究>(课题批准号2011&ZD09)子课题<金融纠纷解决的法制环境>的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：金融司法对证券诉讼的限制,体现在案件受理前的筛选机制、受理附加条件、审理中调解偏好等方面,其形成有着司法资源约束、地方司法保护、司法运行惯性等多种原因。排斥性司法是资本市场上违法行为多发的重要制度诱因。违法行为多发及司法保护缺失的双重预期,引发投资者规避策略的运用,导致市场过度波动、交易成本升高、资源配置效率降低等不良后果。当前司法政策与我国金融发展目标之间存在根本矛盾,包容性司法应当成为金融司法改革的目标选择。The restrictions of financial justice on securities litigation caused by judicial resource constraint,local judicial protection and judicial operation inertia,are embodied in the screening mechanism before accepting cases,additional conditions concerning acceptance,mediation preference,and so on.Exclusive justice is an important institutional reason for frequent occurrence of violations of the laws in capital market.The double expectation of frequent occurrence of violations of the laws and the absence of judicial protection strengthens investors＇ preference for avoidance strategy and results in bad consequences such as excessive market fluctuations,the increase in transaction costs and the reduction in resource allocation efficiency.Current judicial policies are fundamentally in contradiction to the aim of financial development in China,and inclusive justice should become the aim of financial justice reform.

关 键 词：金融司法 司法排斥 包容性司法 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]