Bargaining Game Theoretic Power Control in Selfish Cooperative Relay Networks  

作　　者：Guo-Peng Zhang Peng Liu En-Jie Ding 

机构地区：[1]Internet of Things Research Center,China University of Mining and Technology,Xuzhou 221008,PRC

出　　处：《International Journal of Automation and computing》2012年第2期221-224,共4页国际自动化与计算杂志（英文版）

基　　金：supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 60972059);Project Funded by the Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions (PAPD);Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of China (Nos. 2010QNA27 and 2011QNB26);China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (No. 20100481185);the Ph. D. Programs Foundation of Ministry of Education of China (Nos. 20090095120013 and 20110095120006);Talent Introduction Program, and Young Teacher Sailing Program of China University of Mining and Technology

摘　　要：Wireless cooperative communications require appropriate power allocation （PA） between the source and relay nodes. In selfish cooperative communication networks, two partner user nodes could help relaying information for each other, but each user node has the incentive to consume his power solely to decrease its own symbol error rate （SER） at the receiver. In this paper, we propose a fair and efficient PA scheme for the decode-and-forward cooperation protocol in selfish cooperative relay networks. We formulate this PA problem as a two-user cooperative bargaining game, and use Nash bargaining solution （NBS） to achieve a win-win strategy for both partner users. Simulation results indicate that the NBS is fair in that the degree of cooperation of a user only depends on how much contribution its partner can make to decrease its SER at the receiver, and efficient in the sense that the SER performance of both users could be improved through the game.Wireless cooperative communications require appropriate power allocation （PA） between the source and relay nodes. In selfish cooperative communication networks, two partner user nodes could help relaying information for each other, but each user node has the incentive to consume his power solely to decrease its own symbol error rate （SER） at the receiver. In this paper, we propose a fair and efficient PA scheme for the decode-and-forward cooperation protocol in selfish cooperative relay networks. We formulate this PA problem as a two-user cooperative bargaining game, and use Nash bargaining solution （NBS） to achieve a win-win strategy for both partner users. Simulation results indicate that the NBS is fair in that the degree of cooperation of a user only depends on how much contribution its partner can make to decrease its SER at the receiver, and efficient in the sense that the SER performance of both users could be improved through the game.

关 键 词：Cooperative relaying DECODE-AND-FORWARD power allocation cooperative game theory Nash bargaining solution. 

分 类 号：TN915[电子电信—通信与信息系统] O225[电子电信—信息与通信工程]