大股东控制下的内部资本转移与利益冲突  

The behavior of internal capital transfers and interest conflicting under the control of major shareholders

作　　者：龚志文[1] 陈金龙[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学工商管理学院,福建泉州362021

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2012年第2期224-230,共7页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70573033);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(JB-SK1103)

摘　　要：构建了大股东控制下的企业集团内部资本转移优化模型,定量地推导了三种情景下的均衡结果、参与各方福利和影响因素,以此对大股东控制下的内部资本交易行为进行研究.研究发现,理想型内部资本交易实现了资本配置的最优化和社会福利的最大化,形成参与各方"共赢"的局面,实现了集团公司财务目标;附加冲突成本的内部资本交易存在资本转移不足行为,资本交易仍可以持续维持,基本实现集团公司财务目标;侵害型内部资本交易存在过度转移资本行为,资本交易不可持续,实现的财务目标只能是在损害利益相关者的前提下,追求控股股东财富最大化.This paper constructs a model to illustrate the optimization of capital transfers within an enterprise group which was controlled by major shareholders. The capital transfers behavior is investigate by means of the model, which gives the equilibrium results, benefits of all parties involved and the influencing factors under three circumstances. The results show that capital allocation optimization and social welfare maximization may result in the ideal internal capital transactions, in a ＂win-win＂ situation for all parties, and the achievement of the group＇s financial goals. While the internal capital transactions can be kept and financial goals can be met in the internal capital transactions with conflicting costs, insufficient capital transfers may result. An excessive capital transfer may result in the infringed intemal capital transactions, where the internal capital allocation was not sustainable, and the financial goals can only be achieved by pursuing shareholder wealth maximization at the expense of stakeholders.

关 键 词：内部资本市场 控股股东 资本转移 公司治理 

分 类 号：TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]