民营企业政治关联、盈利信息与长期债务契约  

Private Firms' Political Connection,Profitability Information and Long-term Debt Contract

作　　者：倪婷婷[1] 李连军[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093 [2]南京财经大学会计学院,江苏南京210046

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2012年第4期110-116,124,共8页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部研究生培养创新计划--南京大学国际化博士生项目(IAPHD)

摘　　要：以2008-2009年沪深两市民营上市公司为样本,考察了政治关联是否可以替代会计信息在公司长期债务契约中的作用。研究结果表明,企业盈利能力对长期贷款契约的影响主要体现在更长的贷款期限方面,政治关联这一替代性的非正式机制并不能替代会计信息在信贷决策中的有用性。另外,分地区的研究结果显示,东部地区民营企业的政治关联有利于其获得更长的贷款期限,而这一现象在中西部地区并不明显。The authors take the private firms listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2009 as the samples to exam whether the influence of political-connection can replace that of accounting information.The findings are that profitability information and political-connection influence debt contract mainly on loan tenure and that political connection allows private companies easier access to long-term loans,but that there is no evidence shows political-connection is alternative to profitability information on long-term debt contract.Sub-regional study finds that compared to the western and centre region,political-connection affects the long-term contract more in the eastern region.

关 键 词：民营企业 政治关联 会计信息 长期债务契约 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学]