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作 者:向锐[1]
出 处:《山西财经大学学报》2012年第4期117-124,共8页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基 金:中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(2009SCU11097);四川省审计厅科研基金项目(201110A);中国博士后基金项目(20080430782)
摘 要:基于中国的制度背景,考察了终极所有权结构、终极产权性质对自愿设立审计委员会的影响。研究发现,终极控股股东的控制权、控制权与所有权的分离度与自愿设立审计委员会存在显著为负的关系,而终极所有权与自愿设立审计委员会却存在显著为正的关系;终极产权国有性质与自愿设立审计委员会存在显著为正的关系,但在终极产权为国有性质的上市公司中,终极控制权、控制权与所有权的分离度与自愿设立审计委员会之间有更加显著为负的关系,而终极所有权与自愿设立审计委员会之间有更加显著为正的关系。Based on the Chinese institutional background,the paper tests factors affecting the voluntary formation of audit committees in Chinese listed companies.The author finds that the voluntary formation of audit committees is negatively proportion to the control right proportion of the biggest ultimate controller,the separation of the ultimate control right and the cash flow right;the voluntary formation of audit committees is positively proportion to the cash flow right;the voluntary formation of audit committees is positively proportion to state-owned nature of the ultimate controllers' property,but the voluntary formation of audit committees is more remarkable negatively proportion to the control right proportion of the biggest ultimate controller,the separation of the ultimate control right and the cash flow right,and is more positively proportion to the cash flow right in the companies of state-owned nature of the ultimate controllers' property.
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