我国高等教育质量保障体系中地方与中央政府权力博弈分析  

The analysis on power game relationship between the central and the local authorities in higher education quality assurance system in china

作　　者：郭欣[1] 刘元芳[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《现代教育管理》2012年第4期53-57,共5页Modern Education Management

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目"高等学校个人教育产权研究"(09YJA880019);辽宁省教育科学"十一五"规划2008年度重点立项课题"契约理论与现代大学制度建设"(JG08DA009)

摘　　要：中央和地方政府的权力博弈关系与高等教育质量能否得以保障息息相关。在我国高等教育质量保障体系建设中,中央与地方政府存在着"合作博弈"与"非合作博弈"。在"合作博弈"中表现为主动权力博弈形式,在"非合作博弈"中表现为隐性权力博弈、灰色权力博弈两种形式。合理划定中央与地方政府在高等教育质量保障体系建设中的权力界限,中央适度让渡一些权力给地方政府,中央和地方政府行使高等教育质量保障权力时需要道德的规约是我国中央和地方政府在高等教育质量保障体系中更好地发挥作用的必由之路。The power game relationship between the central and the local authorities is closely related to higher education quality assurance system.And there exists Cooperative Game and Non-Cooperative Game.In the Cooperative Game,there is a representation such as active power game.While in the Non-Cooperative Game,there are two representations such as underlying power game and gray power game.In order to build a better higher education quality assurance system,it can start from fixing the power limit of the central and the local authorities in a higher education quality assurance system,delegating some management to the local authorities and restraining themselves with morality.

关 键 词：中央政府 地方政府 博弈 

分 类 号：G649.21[文化科学—高等教育学]