Evolution of Cooperation in Evolutionary Games for Heterogeneous Interactions  

Evolution of Cooperation in Evolutionary Games for Heterogeneous Interactions

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作  者:钱晓岚 杨俊忠 

机构地区:[1]School of Electronics and Information,Zhejiang University of Media and Communications [2]School of Science,Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications

出  处:《Communications in Theoretical Physics》2012年第4期547-552,共6页理论物理通讯(英文版)

基  金:Supported by Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 11147112

摘  要:When a population structure is modelled as a square lattice,the cooperation may be improved for an evolutionary prisoner dilemma game or be inhibited for an evolutionary snowdrift game.In this work,we investigate cooperation in a population on a square lattice where the interaction among players contains both prisoner dilemma game and snowdrift game.The heterogeneity in interaction is introduced to the population in two different ways:the heterogenous character of interaction assigned to every player(HCP) or the heterogenous character of interaction assigned to every link between any two players(HCL).The resonant enhancement of cooperation in the case of HCP is observed while the resonant inhibition of cooperation in the case of HCL is prominent.The explanations on the enhancement or inhibition of cooperation are presented for these two cases.

关 键 词:evolutionary games heterogenous interactions resonant enhancement and inhibition 

分 类 号:O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]

 

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