基于Stackelberg微分博弈模型的天然气管输定价研究  

Research on Natural Gas Pipeline Transmission Pricing Based on Stackelberg Differential Game

作　　者：丁浩[1] 董光亮[1] 杜吉家[2] 张琪[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国石油大学(华东)经济管理学院,山东青岛266555 [2]胜利油田经济开发研究院,山东东营257001

出　　处：《河南科学》2012年第4期517-520,共4页Henan Science

基　　金：山东省自然基金项目资助(ZR2011GQ004);教育部人文社科项目资助(11YJCZH108);山东省自主创新基金项目资助(11CX04032B)

摘　　要：利用两阶段动态博弈理论和Stackelberg微分博弈模型,从政府建立合理的天然气管输价格规制的角度出发,对政府和天然气运输企业间的博弈定价进行研究,并通过HJB方程和逆向归纳法对模型求解,得出政府和天然气管输企业的最优策略以及在此情况下的最优天然气管输价格,对我国制定合理的天然气管输价格具有重要的指导意义.Based on two stage dynamic game theory and Stackelberg differential game model and in view of establishing a reasonable natural gas price regulation by government,this paper researches the game pricing between the government and the natural gas transportation enterprises.The optimal strategy of government and the natural gas pipeline company and the best of natural gas price is obtained by using the HJB equations and backward induction method to solve the model,and it has an important guiding significance to establish reasonable natural gas price.

关 键 词：两阶段动态博弈 Stackelberg微分博弈模型 天然气 管输价格 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]