基金治理能够吸引投资者吗?——基于我国开放式基金“赎回异象”的实证检验  

Can Fund Dividend Attract Investors？ An Empirical Research on Open Fund ＂Redemption Puzzle＂ in China

作　　者：李增泉[1] 何小杨[2] 孔祥[3] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学会计与财务研究院 [2]北京大学光华管理学院 [3]上海财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《中国会计评论》2011年第4期405-422,共18页China Accounting Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金“我国民营企业家族化研究”(项目编号:70802035);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(项目编号:07JJD630007)“我国民营企业家族化的制度诱因和经济后果问题研究”的阶段性成果;上海财经大学研究生科研创新基金资助(项目编号为CXJJ-2011-381和CXJJ-2011-383)

摘　　要：基金的可赎回权是投资者减少基金代理问题的重要治理机制,本文基于2006—2010年中国偏股型开放式基金数据进行了实证检验。本文发现基金治理机制越弱,基金投资者会越倾向于在基金业绩较好时赎回其持有份额,即产生基金净流量,基金内部治理机制的改善可以减轻负相关关系,从而有利于基金规模的健康发展。本文的经验证据一方面表明基金投资者的赎回权是重要的治理机制,另一方面表明我国基金治理机制的改善是促进基金业健康发展的必有之径。Fama and Jensen （1983） argued that investors in an open-end mutual fund can vote with their feet by withdrawing assets from or adding assets to the fund which is an important fund governance mechanism. Based on the sample of open-end mutual fund from 2006 to 2010, this paper testd the theory and found that with bad fund governance mechanism, fund investors will redeem the assets at good present performance, and this will cause negative relation between Performance-Inflow relationship, and better fund governance mechanism can reduce the negative relationship. Our findings suggested that investors＇ ability to withdraw from or add assets to funds is an effective fund governance mechanism and the promotion of fund governance is an effective way for the health development of China＇s development of mutual funds.

关 键 词：基金治理 业绩—资金流动关系 赎回异象 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]